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Abstract: Incentive models are becoming increasingly
popular in Mobile Peer to Peer Networks (M-P2P) as these
models entice node participation in return for a virtual
currency to combat free riding and to effectively manage
constraint resources in the network. Many routing protocols
proposed are based on best effort data traffic policy, such as
the shortest route selection (hop minimization). Using
virtual currency to find a cost effective optimal route from
the source to the destination, while considering Quality of
Service (QoS) aspects such as bandwidth and service
capacity constraints for data delivery, remains a challenging
task due to the presence of multiple paths and service
providers. Modeling the network as a directed weighted
graph and using the cost acquired from the price function as
an incentive to pay the intermediate nodes in M-P2P
networks to forward data, we develop a Game theoretic
approach based on stochastic games to find an optimal route
considering QoS aspect. The performance of our routing
protocol is evaluated and compared with some existing
routing protocols and the result shows that our protocol
proves to be efficient compared to shortest-path DSR and
multiple paths SMR in terms of average response time,
energy and bandwidth utilization in the network.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Mobile Peer to Peer Network (M-P2P) is a dynamic set of
co-operating peers communicate by sending messages either
through a single hop using a direct wireless link or through
multiple hops using a series of wireless links. Wireless links
between the communicating nodes can fail and thus, can
disconnect two nodes. It can occur when a communicating
node leaves the network or move such that they are not in
the transmission range of each other. In M-P2P networks,
each peer is not only responsible for sending and receiving
its own data, but it also has to forward packets from other
peers. M-P2P networks have advantages compared to the
conventional wireless networks such as rapid deployment,
robustness, flexibility and support for mobility, which are
useful in a wider range of applications where temporary
networks are needed or there is lack of infrastructure. Some
of the peers in these networks may be critical from the point
of view of survivability. In other words, their failure can
cause temporary disruptions in the network either due to
their strategic location in the topology or the data they carry.
To increase the network life time, nodes with scare
resources such as battery power will demand a high cost to
route so that they can provide services for the longer time.
A peer could be selfish and save its resources by not
cooperating. That is, instead of forwarding the packets to
others, a peer could use the resources of others in
forwarding only self-originated packets. In battlefield
operations, though the nodes naturally co-operate, but at the
same time, nodes should drop some of the route requests if
those nodes have a high cost to forward a packet. This could
978-0-7695-3650-7/09 $25.00 © 2009 IEEE
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be due to the importance of the node’s existence for a longer
period which is critical for the successful completion of the
mission. Therefore, it has to preserve the energy and
forward only selective packets.
Economic models [MMK] play an important role to avoid
selfishness and promote co-operation among the peers.
Every peer that is a part of the route is rewarded with an
incentive (in terms of virtual currency) to forward the packet
to the next peer in the route. The protocol discussed in
[WCK] focuses on the problem of on demand routing in
resource rationed ad hoc networks. This approach shows
performance gains in terms of data throughput and energy
consumption but it only succeeds in finding a shortest
possible route like [BJM] in terms of lowest cost expressed
in virtual currency. The protocol described in [WCK] can be
categorized as a routing protocol based on best-effort data
traffic policy, as it completely relies on finding the best
route in terms of cost. Our approach takes into account QoS
factors such as available bandwidth, energy used and service
capacity, which not only helps in finding a low cost route
but also finds a path which has less congestion in the route
(more available bandwidth and less workload). As the
available bandwidth at a node gives information about
traffic condition itself, so using this information helps in
finding an optimal route.
By modeling the network as a directed weighted graph and
using the cost determined from the price function as an
incentive to pay intermediate nodes based on the cost of
transmission directly related with the battery usage, we
develop a Game theoretic approach based on stochastic
games to find the next hop to finally build an optimal cost
route. We will also formulate a capacity function which
provides QoS support such as bandwidth available, energy
used and service capacity in M-P2P networks to forward
data. The simulation results show that our proposed
Incentive based Routing Protocol (IRP) for single and
multiple paths show a better performance in terms of
average response time, bandwidth availability and energy
utilization in the network compared to the Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR) [BJM] for the shortest path and Split
Multipath Routing (SMR) [LG] .
II. RELATED WORK
Several routing algorithms for M-P2P networks, with their
advantages and disadvantages have been proposed in [SGF].
Dynamic Source Routing [DSR] (reactive routing) based on
the concept of source routing, Ad Hoc on Demand Distance
Vector routing [SGF] (reactive algorithm) where every hop
of the route maintains the next hop information by its own
and Zone routing protocol [ZRP] which combines proactive
and reactive elements are presented. Various incentive
mechanisms [CN] have been proposed to promote

selflessness and to foster co-operation in the network.
[MMK] discusses economic incentive models and their
usefulness for extending existing solutions to entice node
participation and handling of resource constraints.
Hierarchical Routing [BJM, SGF] in resource rationed ad
hoc network has been addressed in [WCK]. Many game
theory approaches have been studied in [TS], introducing
games such as co-operative games and non-cooperative
games. [DLC] proposes a model for resource management
in competitive wireless networks, where the interaction
between the service provider and the users is modeled as a
non co-operative game.
III. MOBILE P2P SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Assume that a M-P2P network consists of n peers and each
peer communicates in omni-direction and to start with, they
all have the same transmission power with a circle of
transmission range D. All the links are bi-directional. We
model M-P2P network as a directed weighted graph G= (V,
E, wij), where V denotes the set of vertices (peers), E the
edges (wireless links) on the graph and wij, the weight on the
edge E from vi to vj. The link between vi and vj exists if and
only if these nodes are in the transmission range D. The
weight on each edge is defined as the cost of communication
from one node to the other. Here, we give some of the
definitions used in the system architecture.
Broker nodes (BN): These backbone nodes are the
dominant nodes of the virtual backbone network.
Access point nodes (APN): These nodes are the nodes which
are at one hop distance from the broker nodes. These nodes
act as the access point for all other non back bone nodes in
the network to connect to a broker node.
Non Broker nodes (NBN): All nodes other than the broker
and access point nodes are the non broker nodes in the
network.
Link Failure frequency (LFF): This parameter represents the
total number of link failures/ losses of a particular node in a
fixed time.
Link Failure frequency System Threshold (LFFth): This
parameter represents the system threshold that sets the
preferred level of link losses for the backbone nodes.
There are two very important aspects that advocate the use
of a broker based system. The first major set of advantages
is due to the following facts: 1) Scalability can be achieved
when network becomes larger, as every newly joined node
connects to the backbone structure 2) Response time for
locating services reduces, as every query processes through
the broker and these brokers has the current routing
information and 3) Servers (peers) are not flooded with the
service requests, as every service requests pass through the
broker. The second advantage follows from the utilization of
the virtual backbones or clusters for improving the
efficiency and quality of routing protocols. These two
important aspects makes the broker based architecture not
only feasible but a preferred architecture for routing in MP2P networks.

3.1 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
Backbone network nodes are selected from a subset of the
network nodes to form a relatively stable set. It discovers the
paths between broker nodes, and adapts to the topology
changes by adding/removing nodes into/from the set.
Initially, every node is a non back bone (Non Broker) node.
Before deciding on their role in the network, these nodes
collect their neighborhood information by sending
messages, for a time period say T. At the end of the waiting
period T and considering the LFF information, any node
which satisfies the stability constraint (LFF < LFFth) joins
the virtual backbone network and identified as the relatively
stable node (checking with the link loss threshold (LFFth)
helps to avoid the nodes with a lot of link losses relative to
the backbone nodes). We term the nodes forming the back
bone as Broker nodes. The other nodes still keeps on waiting
for the messages in the network for the next waiting period
T. At any point during the waiting period, if these nodes get
messages directly from the Broker nodes, these nodes
associates itself with the broker node, hence termed as
APN’s.(Access Point Nodes). These nodes can join the
backbone network based on its LFF information in the next
waiting period by satisfying the stability constraint. All
nodes other than the BN’s or APN’s in the network are
called as NBN’s (Non Broker Nodes). These nodes interact
with the broker nodes through the access point nodes which
are the direct contact to the Broker nodes. Hence, every
NBN has to check for the APN in its transmission range in
order to interact with the BN or else find NBN’s in its
transmission range which has APN in its transmission range.
Given any two broker nodes, three kinds of virtual links are
possible: 1) Single hop virtual link, where two broker nodes
are directly connected i.e. the broker nodes are at a 1-hop
distance, 2) 2-hop virtual link, where an APN exists between
the two broker nodes. When there exists two APN’s
between any two broker nodes, they are at a 3-hop distance
and hence it is called a 3-hop virtual link. We assume that a
maximum of 3-hop distance is possible along the virtual link
of two broker nodes when the network is large enough.
Every backbone node keeps the routing information of the
BN’s in its vicinity or transmission range. If no BN exists in
the transmission range it keeps the information of APN’s
located in its range to communicate with the BN’s. Every
node (i) that is a service provider has to register with its
corresponding BN. If node i want to register its service, it
has to register with the BN associated with it, assuming i as
a non broker node. If the node i is already a BN, it registers
the service at itself. Any time the location of the service
provider node changes; it has to register its service with the
corresponding BN and unregistering the service at the
previous BN.
IV. INCENTIVE BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL
When a source node VS initiates a request for a data item d
stored at a node VD , all the nodes in the route co-operate in
forwarding the data item to the next node to finally deliver
the data to the source node VS. A price p is associated at
each intermediate node as the forwarding cost of the data
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and the range of frequency f is proportional to the
bandwidth B. Now the above formula reduces to

item d. In the process, each node on the route is paid Virtual
Currency (VC) based on a cost function associated for
forwarding the packets. Using the virtual currency, available
bandwidth and work load at each node, an algorithm using
the Game theory is designed to find an optimal route to
service the request. To calculate the cost in terms of virtual
currency over an edge, we will develop an equation based
on various network parameters.
4.1 PARAMETERS AND PRICE FUNCTION
Bandwidth: This parameter indicates how many free
bandwidth slots a node possesses for forwarding the data.
Each free slot denotes the available bandwidth at a node
measured in KB (Kilo Bytes).
Virtual Currency (VC): It is calculated using a price
function based on several parameters. Many parameters
could be considered, but we confine ourselves to the
following:
Transmission Power ( ): This involves the transmission
power (battery power) utilized in forwarding the data packet
from the transmitting node to the next immediate node.
Receiving Power ( ): It is the power involved in receiving a
data packet at a particular node.
Euclidean Distance (e): It is the aerial distance between any
two nodes in the network. This can be calculated based on
the signal strength of the transmitting peer.
Bandwidth (B): This represents the frequency in which these
peer’s operate.
Elapsed Time (t): It is the time allowed for a mobile peer to
respond, after which the peer assumes that the packet is lost.
The transmitting peer has to resend the packet or opt for a
different route.
Table 4.1: Summary of the notations
Notation

We formulate the cost equation into three cases:
(Cost at the source node) At the Source node (data
requesting node), the total cost constitutes to only the
as it
transmission power of the source node, i.e,
does not have a previous node and
, where
are
the current, next and previous nodes respectively.
(Cost at an intermediate node): At any given intermediate
is the transmitting power and
the receiving
node if
power of that node, then the total power used in transmitting
and receiving a packet is
=
where

the current, next and previous nodes respectively
(Cost at the destination node): At the Destination node(data
serving node), the total cost constitutes to only the receiving
power of the node i.e.,
where

are

the

current, next and previous nodes respectively
is the signal strength then Euclidean distance e can be
If
and
calculated in the equations
calculated as
above is used as the virtual currency cost to forward the
packets through the intermediate nodes
4.2 CALCULATION OF TRANSMISSION POWER
We use the signal strength and propagation function to
calculate the transmit power of a peer,
i.e
where
is the propagation
function defined over
, is the set of
locations of the peers over a plane and
gives the loss
in bandwidth B due to propagation at location
, when
a packet is originated from location
. Let the distance
between
be and
be the threshold distance then
can be defined as

Significance
Transmission power of a node
Receiving power of a node
Antenna gains of the transmission and receiving
nodes,
Rectangular area of the antenna aperture in cm2
Wavelength

e

are

Euclidean distance
Constant (the speed of propagation of the wave)
Weight on an edge

The value of is usually between 1 and 5 depending on the
environment. Hence, the transmission power is defined as

Signal Strength

The total cost incurred on an edge of a shortest path between
any two intermediate nodes is defined as
According to the Friis Transmission [FTE] equation, the
ratio of power received by the receiving antenna Pr to the
P
power input to the transmitting antenna t is given by
where for simplicity, we assume that
communication is using the same protocol such as 802.11g
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4.3 INCENTIVE BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL
USING GAME THERORY
All the nodes in the network are the players of the game.
Based on each other’s decision making behavior, a policy or
strategy is developed which helps in finding the best
possible route. We fix our outcome as finding the
destination peer and look forward to end the game with that
desired outcome. The preferences of a peer can be expressed
with a utility function, which maps every consequence to a
real number. When a peer makes a decision, it chooses one
peer over the other, which is defined as the action of the

peer. Sometimes these actions can be defined as the
probabilistic distribution which is dependent on the game’s
behavior, whether it provides the complete information or
not. The set of all actions taken by a peer to reach a possible
outcome can be defined as a strategy. At the beginning of
each stage, the game is in some state and the peers select
their actions. Each peer receives a payoff (virtual currency)
that depends on the current state and the chosen actions. The
game then moves to a new random state whose distribution
depends on the previous state and the actions chosen by the
peer. The procedure is repeated at each new state and the
game continues for a finite number of stages until it reaches
a termination stage and an optimal route is found.
To formulate the game in the M-P2P scenario, we consider a
discrete time stochastic process, Markov Decision Process
(MDP) characterized by a set of states. Each state defines
the state of the mobile peer. For each state there are several
actions from which decision maker must choose. Any action
on a state, results in the change of state for the peer. For a
game in any state in S, the application of Action A, will
. This is determined by a
result in a new state
which is based on the transition
transition function
probabilities. Formally, MDP is defined as,
I. A finite state space
for each state
II. A finite set of controls
III. Transition probabilities
that are
equal to the probability of next state being after applying
control in state .
associated to
and
IV. A cost
Table 4.2: Summary of notations
Notation

Significance
A state in the finite state space
A successor state of the state
Set of controls for the state
Cost associated with the state
and the
control u,
calculated from the
virtual currency price function
Available bandwidth of a node in state
Strategy or policy, a finite set of sequence of
controls
Cost associated with the policy
Transition probability

As discussed in Section 3, we consider a MP2P network as a
directed weighted graph, with a cost assigned to each arc
(edge) of the graph. The game is played among the peers
with a peer acting either as a source node, intermediate node
or a destination node. A peer as a decision maker can be in
. We represent each
one of the states
state as the combination of peers from the source to any
intermediate or destination peer. For example, we say that
the game is in state if the game has traversed through the
. Then the state
is represented as
peers say
.so every time a peer is reached, the game is moved
to a new state and the state is represented as described
above. The problem now reduces to finding a path from a
graph with a set of states and cost associated with each
transition (from one state to the other). This can be treated

as a stochastic shortest path problem to select a successor
at each state
, such that
state
is an edge, and the path formed by a
sequence of successor states starting at any state
and has a length with
terminates at the destination state
and
minimum sum of costs over all paths that start at
terminate at .
A stochastic shortest path problem is an MDP problem in
is such that
which the state space
is the starting state and the destination state. Each state
. The system
is associated with a finite set of controls
dynamics are controlled by transition probabilities that maps
states and controls to states. Every time the player leaves the
state, a cost
is incurred which is associated with
,
and the available free bandwidth
where
(a QoS factor) is also considered. A strategy or
of
policy (for a route) is a finite sequence
functions where maps states to controls, so that the player
in state . The cost
applies the control
(initial
associated with policy S , when system starts at
state) is
where the expected
value E is induced from the probability distribution of
transition probabilities for some k. The cost for a policy
is further refined by eliminating the expectation
where
operator.
is the cost on an edge and
is the
transition probability, which is based on the virtual currency
cost, bandwidth, Service Capacity and the type of node (BN,
APN or NBN, based on Link Failure Frequency defined
earlier). All these QoS factors are considered in defining the
transition probabilities. Initially, we categorize each of these
factors into three different levels {low, med, high}
depending on their values. We define a probability function
for each of these levels and, the combination of all the
probabilities with different factors would determine the
transition probability. The probability function is defined in
terms of the four independent probabilistic functions
described below.
where,

,

and
.
) as the probability of reaching a state
We define
as the
among the set of states identified and
among the set of states
probability of reaching a state
identified with a virtual currency VC (VC can be in any of
the three levels {low, med, high}). Similarly
among the set of
as the probability of reaching a state
states identified with a bandwidth BW (BW can be in any of
as the
the three levels {low, med, high}),
among the set of states
probability of reaching a state
identified with a workload WL (WL can be in any of the
as the
three levels {low, med, high}) and
among the set of states
probability of reaching a state
identified with a node type TY ( TY can be in any of the
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three levels {BN, APN, NBN}). For example let’s consider
that the virtual currency is divided into three different levels
{low, med, high} with probability of selecting an edge of
low cost is 3/6, medium is 2/6 and high is 1/6. As we need
to consider an edge of low cost we give a higher probability
for the cost being low. Similarly we define the probabilities
for all the QoS factors. This can be seen in the table 4
defined below. The node is categorized as BN, APN and
NBN as defined in Section 3.1. Using this categorization,
we define probabilities for the selection of a node. The
probability for selecting a Broker Node (BN) is higher
(based on the network architecture, LFF) than that of APN
which is higher than NBN. The probabilities for BN, APN
and NBN are 4/7, 2/7 and 1/7, respectively.
The transition probability of an edge is defined as the
product of the four independent factors listed above. For
example selecting an edge which has low cost, medium
bandwidth, medium Service Capacity and the node type as
BN will have the probability of (3/6)(2/9)(2/8)(4/7) i.e. 1/63.
From the Game theory approach defined above, we select an
edge which has the highest transition probability over the set
of all possible edges. Hence, it is clear that the transition
probabilities of selecting an edge with low cost, high
bandwidth, low Service Capacity and node type of BN is
always higher ( (3/6)(6/9)(5/8)(4/7) i.e. 5/21) than that of
selecting an edge with high cost, low bandwidth, high
Service Capacity and node type NBN is always lower
(which is (1/6)(1/9)(1/8)(1/7) i.e. 1/3024).
A situation might arise where the transition probabilities of
edges may be equal. In such a scenario, to select an edge, we
prioritize the aforementioned QoS factors in the following
order, type of node, virtual currency, bandwidth and Service
Capacity. A higher priority is given to the node type in
order to select the most reliable path, as the type of node is
classified in terms of LFF (Link Failure Frequency). It is
unlikely that the transition probabilities of all the QoS
factors are equal and if such a case arises, selection of any of
the edges proves to be fruitful.
There are always one or more policies that are better than or
equal to all the others. These are called the optimal policies.
*
We denote them by S . The optimality is achieved when
where

, for every policy

The capacity/free bandwidth for the policy is calculated
based on the available free slots at a node. The bandwidth at
a node is divided into slots and each node maintains the slot
information of its neighbor by transferring messages. The
free bandwidth between any two nodes is denoted by
where X, Y are the nodes. To calculate the free bandwidth
, which gives the
we take into consideration
available free slots at a node X. If the nodes are at a single
hop distance:
If the nodes are separated by a multi hop distance:

The generalized form is the recursive equation of a
minimization function i.e.,
.
Table 4.3: Summary of Notations
Notation

Significance
Probability of reaching a state
from state
on control u
Transition probability of the virtual currency to
reach a state given a state
Transition probability of the bandwidth to reach a
state given a state
Transition probability of the workload to reach a
state given a state
Transition probability of node type given a state

Table 4.4: Probabilities of different levels of QoS Factors
Probability
VC
Bandwidth
Service Capacity

Low
3/6
1/9
5/8

Med
2/6
2/9
2/8

High
1/6
6/9
1/8

Service Capacity is also one of the QoS factors which we
consider in defining an optimal policy. We define Service
Capacity in terms of workload at a node. If a node is
processing more number of requests at a given time we
consider the Service Capacity to be high and do not prefer to
opt that node in the route. The optimal policy is achieved
based on the cost, free bandwidth and service capacity i.e.
minimum cost, minimum service capacity and maximum
free bandwidth.
V. SIMULATION
We built a simulation environment in Java to study the
performance by conducting experiments on the Incentive
based routing protocol (IRP) described in Section 4 and
comparing it to the Shortest Path Dynamic source routing
(SP-DSR) [BJM] protocol. The simulation area is
approximately 1000 X 600 meters and it can afford a range
of 30 to 150 peers in the network. The maximum connection
distance between any two peers is 100 m. The queries are
randomly generated and it is done at an average of 5 queries
per second. The maximum bandwidth between any two
peers is 128 kbps and 8 kbps being the minimum. The
movement of the nodes is handled by implementing the
random way point model (RWP) [BRS] . In RWP, each
node moves along a zig zag line from one way point to the
other. The random way points are uniformly distributed over
the given area and all the nodes tend to converge at the
center. RWP chooses a destination and speed for a node
randomly and independently, and the node will keep moving
at that speed until it reaches that destination. We randomly
choose speed which is uniformly distributed in the interval
[1, Vmax).
The formation of the node cluster (Broker architecture) is
handled by implementing a Connected Dominating Set
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Parameter
Simulation area
Number of peers
Maximum connection distance
Bandwidth between peers
Queries generated per sec

Range
1000 X 600 m2
30 ~ 150
100 m
8 ~ 128 Kbps
5

Average Hop Count

60

30
IRP

60

90

120

Number of peers
SP-DSR
multipath-IRP

150
SMR

Figure 2: Average Hop Count vs. the number of peers
20

Avg Response Time
Avg response time (ms)

20
0

1500
1000
500

Avg Hop Count vs number of requests

0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

0
30
IRP

40

Avg hop Count

5.1 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The results are studied to analyze the metrics such as
bandwidth usage, response time, average hop count and
energy utilization and compare these metrics with those of
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [BJM] protocol.
5.1.1 Average response time vs. Number of peers
We define response time as the time required to successfully
find an optimal route from source to the destination. We
perform the experiment by increasing the number of peers in
the network from 30 to 150. Figure 1 shows the plot of
average response time against the number of peers. We
observe that as the number of peers’ increases, the
performance IRP gets better compared to the shortest path
DSR due to the presence of the broker peer architecture that
uses less number of nodes in processing a request.

finding multiple maximal disjoint paths to the destination,
we observe that IRP for multi paths still performs better
compared to split multipath routing (SMR). There is a slight
increase in the response time observed compared to IRP for
single optimal route as finding maximal disjoint paths costs
time over finding all the routes.
5.1.2 Average hop count vs. increasing number of peers
Hop Count is defined as the number of hops a packet takes,
starting from the source peer to reach the destination peer.
We increase the hop count as the packet reaches each
intermediate peer on its way to the destination. Figure 7
shows the comparison between the hop counts by Incentive
based routing protocol (IRP) and DSR with the increase of
the number of peers in the network.
From the Figure 2, we observe that the average hop count
for IRP is little high compared to the DSR. Though not a
significant difference is observed, the difference is because
of the incorporated QoS factors in finding the route. A slight
increase in the average hop count is observed because of the
argument that, minimizing the hop-count maximizes the
distance traveled by each hop, which is likely to minimize
signal strength and maximize the loss ratio.

Avg hop count

(CDS) [LZT+] model. Several algorithms for the CDS
formation have been discussed in [BDC] , we have used
Steiner tree based CDS construction to define Broker nodes
in the network. As discussed in Section 3.1 all the nodes
connected to these Broker Nodes are the Access Point
Nodes and all the other nodes are classified as Non Broker
Nodes. The effectiveness of the protocol can be evaluated
by performing experiments on the network. The network is
divided into clusters of various sizes. Each cluster will have
three types of nodes Non Broker Node, Access Point Node
and the Broker Node, which acts as the cluster head. A
randomly selected node from one of the clusters requests a
service in the network and the service is processed using the
proposed Game theoretic approach.
Table 5.1: Simulation Parameters

60

90

120

Number of peers
SP-DSR
multipath-IRP

IRP

150

Number of requests
SP-DSR
multipath-IRP

SMR

Figure 3: Average Hop Count vs. the number of requests
SMR

Figure 1: Average response time with increasing number of
peers in the network
Initially when the size of the network is small, we see that,
both the protocols works equally better. When the size of the
network increases, a slight decrease in the response time is
observed in our protocol compared to DSR. This is due to
the performance of the broker peer architecture, which uses
lesser number of peers in processing the request. This
experiment shows that the response time in our protocol is
decreased compared to DSR. Considering the scenario of

Even if the best route is a minimum hop-count route, in a
dense network there may be many routes of the same
minimum length, with widely varying qualities; the arbitrary
choice made by most minimum hop-count metrics is not
likely to be the best. As IRP selects the route based on the
price calculated over several parameters that include signal
strength, transmission power and receiving power, and a low
cost route is always selected, the route may contain more
number of hops with less cost compared to that of DSR
which may contain minimum hops with a high cost. When
multiple paths are selected in IRP, since more than a single
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path is used in routing the packets to the destination, the
average hop count in multipath IRP, SMR[LG] increases
compared to IRP and SP-DSR.
5.1.2.1 Average Hop Count vs. Number of requests
Figure 3 shows a graph of average hop count plotted against
the number of requests in a network. The experiment is
conducted over a network of size 60 with the increasing
number of requests. The readings are taken for every 10
requests. The irregularity of the graph is due to the
randomness in the query generation.
The graph for average hop count for the increasing number
of requests shows a slight difference in the hop count as the
number of requests increases. Thus, we conclude that
increasing the number of requests from 20 to 120 only
increase the hopcount by about one and hence, the method
scale well with increasing the number of requests.
5.1.2.2 Path Optimality
We define path optimaility as the difference between the
number of hops a packet took to reach its destination and the
length of the shortest path that physically existed through
the network when the packet was originated.
Figure 4 shows the scatter graph pointing the differences in
the hop count of both the protocols. The readings are taken
for a network of size 60 while increasing the number of
requests. Each point on the graph shows the difference
between the hop counts of IRP and DSR.

Figure 4: Difference between the number of hops to reach
the destination and the length of the shortest path that
physically existed (IRP vs DSR).
Path optimality (multipath)
Difference in hop count
of Multipath IRP and
SMR

1

path while a difference greater than 0 means that it has taken
a path longer than the shortest path i.e. it took extra hops to
reach the destination. Figure 4 shows the average value of d
between IRP and SP-DSR and Figure 5 shows the average
value of d between multipath IRP and SMR. We observe
that most of the points fall in the range [0,1]. This means
that the optimal route is close to the shortest path. As the
network size is increased we expect a slight increase in the
range of d. This plot helps in understanding the ability of
the optimal routing protocol to efficiently use the network
resources in finding the optimal cost path despite a slight
variation in the hop count.
5.1.3 Available Bandwidth vs. Number of requests
We define available bandwidth between any two nodes (or
over the path) as the set of available free slots between
them. Figure 6 shows the available bandwidth over the path
to destination, varying the network of sizes 30, 45 and 60.
The readings were taken for 11th, 21st and so on requests.
Initially the requests are randomly generated with a
difference of 10 queries ranging from 10 to 50 in the
network of varying size and the readings for 11th, 21st, and
so on requests are taken. The plot shows that initially there
is dip in the bandwidth available, this is because of the
increase in the number of requests utilizing the bandwidth.
However, as more and more requests gets satisfied faster,
more bandwidth becomes available to process additional
requests. Hence, we observe a rise in the available
bandwidth later on with increase in the number of requests.
Figure 7 shows the readings of the available bandwidth for
11th, 21st, so on requests in the network of varying size for
multi path IRP. Comparing the graph of figure 7 with that
of figure 11, we observe that more bandwidth is available
for multi path IRP than that of IRP for single route. This is
because of the presence of multiple routes to the destination.
Hence, we can infer that multi path IRP performs better
compared to the IRP in terms of available bandwidth.
5.1.4 Energy Utilization
Energy utilization is defined as the amount of battery power,
transmission power and reception power a node uses in
processing a request. As we define our price based on these
parameters in VC price function (defined in Section 4.1), we
infer that energy utilized in processing a request to be the
cost observed along the path. Hence we plot energy in terms
of virtual currency derived from the VC price function.

0
0

50
100
Number of requests
Diff in hop count

150

Figure 5: Difference between the average hops in multiple
paths and the average length of the shortest paths physically
existed (multipath-IRP vs SMR)
Let d denotes the difference between the shortest path and
the length of the optimal route actually taken by the packet.
A difference of 0 means that the packet has taken a shortest

Figure 6: Available Bandwidth vs. the number of requests
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Figure 8 shows the graph to read the energy utilized in the
network to process a request. The readings are taken by
increasing the number of peers in the network ranging 30 to
150. As IRP focuses on finding the low cost path compared
to DSR, we observe that the graph of IRP lies below the
shortest path DSR. Initially when the network size is small,
the difference in the energy is less. But, as the network size
is increased we see that IRP performs efficiently in terms of
energy utilization as the focus is on finding the low cost
route in terms of cost unlike SP-DSR which focuses on
finding a path with minimum hops which may cost higher.
Considering the multi paths for IRP and SMR, we observe
that there is slight increase in the energy utilization
compared to the previous models. This is because of the fact
that multiple routes are considered from source to the
destination. This increases the average cost to the
destination, which results in the increase of energy.

Available Bandwidth
(KB)

Available Bandwidth with increasing
number of requests (Multipath)
150
100
50
0

30
45
60

11

21 31 41 51
Number of requests
Fig ure7: Available bandwidth vs. the number of requests
for Multipath IRP

Currency

Energy measured in
terms of Virtual

2000 Energy utilization in the network

0

30

Number of peers

60
90
120
150
IRP
SP-DSR
Figure 8: Energy utilization in the network
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a game theory approach for
finding an optimal cost routing where each peer gets an
incentive to forward the data while discovering a route. In
addition, it takes into consideration the QoS factors such as
energy usage, the bandwidth available, service capacity, and
the link reliability in calculating for the transition
probabilities to select the next hop peer in the path. Our
simulation study validates that IRP is an effective approach
to find an optimal low cost route compared to the shortest
path DSR for the average response time, average hop count,
path optimality, available bandwidth and energy utilization
in the network, and IRP proves to perform better for all the
metrics though a slight difference is observed while
studying the average hop count.
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